‘The long shadow of remembrance’: Remembering the debate about massacre in the Black War in Tasmania by Ryan, Lyndall
Coolabah, Vol.3, 2009, ISSN 1988-5946 Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians, 
Australian Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 
 
 
51 
 
‘The long shadow of remembrance’: 
Remembering the debate about massacre in the Black War in Tasmania 
 
 
Lyndall Ryan 
 
                               
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The Black War in Tasmania 1823-1834, is widely accorded by historians as one 
of the best documented of all Australia’s colonial frontier wars. Yet debate still rages about 
whether massacre was its defining feature and whether it accounted for the deaths of many 
Aborigines. As Keith Windschuttle pointed out in 2002, this is an important debate because 
it reflects on the character of the Australian nation and the behaviour of its colonial forbears 
in seizing control of Aboriginal land.  
 
To understand how the debate took shape and where it stands today, this paper reviews its 
origins in 1835 and then shows how it was played out over three historical periods: 1835-
1870; 1875-1939; and 1948-2008; by focussing on the key protagonists and how they used 
the available sources and methods and explanatory frameworks to make their case. The 
paper finds that in the first period, the belief in widespread massacre dominated the debate, 
drawn from oral testimony from the victorious combatants. In the second period, the belief 
in massacre denial took hold, based on the doctrine of the self-exterminating Aborigine. In 
the third period however, the protagonists engaged in a fierce contest for control of the 
debate. One side argued for massacre denial, based on the belief that more settlers than 
Aborigines were killed in the Black War while the other argued for the opposite case, based 
on the belief that the evidence for massacre was now too overwhelming to be dismissed.  
 
The paper concludes that the massacre debate today is a microcosm of the wider debate 
about the impact of settler colonialism on indigenous peoples; and in particular about the 
humanity of the Tasmanian Aborigines as a hunter gatherer people. Above all it reflects the 
reluctance of many white Australians today, to come to terms with incontrovertible 
evidence about our violent past and to seek reconciliation with the Aboriginal survivors.   
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Introduction  
 
In 2002, historian Keith Windschuttle claimed that, from his own ‘exhaustive’ reading of 
the sources relating to the Black War in Tasmania (1823-1834) he could find only rare 
incidents of massacre and that overall, more settlers than Aborigines were killed in the 
conflict (Windschuttle 2002: 131-166). In making these claims, however, he was simply the 
latest in a long line of historians to enter the massacre debate which has dominated the 
historiography of the Black War since 1835.  
 
The debate is central to understanding the wider debates about settler colonialism and how 
Australian historians have framed the past. How then did the debate begin, how did it 
develop and where does it stand today? To investigate these questions, this paper has 
selected for analysis the arguments made by the key historians who have shaped the debate 
over the last 173 years. To understand how they have used the available sources and 
methods and explanatory frameworks to make their case, the discussion focuses on three 
historical periods: the first from 1835 to1870 when the Black War was still vivid in colonial 
memory;  the second from 1875 to 1939 when the ideas and beliefs of human evolutionary 
science dominated the debate; and the third period from 1948 to 2008 when competing 
views about settler activism and Aboriginal resistance almost took the debate to an impasse. 
In taking this approach the key components of the debate can be identified and their impact 
on the debate today can be assessed.   
 
1835-1870   
 
The massacre debate took off at the end of the Black War, when historians were confronted 
with the grim statistic that fewer than 250 Aborigines had survived. What had happened to 
the rest? If there were few Aborigines at the war’s outset, then how had they managed so 
effectively to terrorise the colonists for so long?  If, however, there were many more, how 
had their numbers declined so rapidly? Faced with this moral dilemma, historians looked to 
the colonists for some explanations.     
 
Henry Melville a radical journalist and newspaper editor set the parameters of the debate.  
Arriving in Tasmania during the war’s second phase in 1827 or 1828 he quickly found 
employment on the leading opposition newspaper. Some of his articles and reports which 
were based on interviews with settlers in the war zones and discussions with the 
professional elite in Hobart, became the basis of his own account of the Black War, 
published in 1835 (Mackaness 1965).   
 
Melville was in no doubt that when the war escalated in late 1826, the Aborigines were 
‘massacred without mercy’. ‘At this period’, he wrote,  ‘it was common for parties of the 
civilized portion of society to scour the bush, and falling in with the tracks of the natives, 
during the night to follow them to their place of encampment, where they were slaughtered 
in cold blood’ (Mackaness 1965:71) and that the effect of martial law, which was in 
operation from November 1828 to February 1832, ‘was to destroy, within twelve months 
after its publication, more than two thirds of these wild creatures, who by degrees dwindled 
away till their populous tribes were swept from the face of the earth’ (Mackaness 1965:79).  
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However the conflict was far too fresh in popular memory for him to identify the 
perpetrators let alone the dates and locations of their awful deeds. The ‘failure’ to produce 
‘real’ evidence would lead a later generation of historians to question his conclusions.   
 
John West faced a similar problem. A Congregational minister and also a journalist he 
arrived in Tasmania four years after the war had ended and quickly realized that it had been 
a defining moment in the colony’s history.  As a leading opponent of convict transportation 
and an ardent advocate of colonial self-government however, he championed the colony’s 
future at the expense of its violent past. In The History of Tasmania published in 1852, he 
was ambivalent about the use and extent of massacre in the Black War.  He offered four 
examples of how it probably happened and like Melville, believed that it was inappropriate 
to identify the perpetrators and witnesses, let alone the dates and places where the 
massacres took place. He explained his decision to take this approach in the following way:  
 
It would be a waste of time even to condense, in the most succinct relation, 
all the incidents that occurred. Narrative is tedious by the monotony of 
detail, and the events themselves were recorded by those who witnessed 
them, with ominous brevity. Such crimes were of daily occurrence; perhaps 
sometimes multiplied by rumour, but often unheard and unrecorded….the 
poet of the Iliad did not describe more numerous varieties, in the slaughter 
of his heroes (Shaw 1971:283).   
 
He admitted that massacre had been an unfortunate component of the war, but he also 
firmly believed that it was more useful for the colonists to ‘move on’ from the horrors of 
the past to prepare for a rosy future of self-government where the Aborigines, which he 
now believed were on ‘the brink of extinction’ could be conveniently forgotten (Shaw 
1971: 285).    
 
James Bonwick disagreed. An evangelical schoolteacher, he had arrived in Tasmania in 
1842, eight years after the war had ended, and like West was also surprised to find that 
memories of the war, dominated the colonial psyche. He began to interview settlers and 
stock-keepers about their experiences and when he moved to Victoria in 1849, collected 
even more accounts from colonists who had left Tasmania in the mid 1830s and who were 
it seems, anxious to recall their involvement in some of the war’s more shocking incidents. 
In The Last of the Tasmanians, published in 1870, he furnished in some cases enough clues 
for the reader to identify the informant, the date of the specific incident and the place where 
it happened.  In all he mentioned 16 instances of massacre, with a combined loss of at least 
300 Aboriginal lives. If any reader was in doubt that massacre was widely used to dispose 
of hundreds of Aborigines in the Black War, then Bonwick’s account appeared to offer 
more than enough evidence to dispel it.  
 
At the end of this period, the debate appeared to have been resolved in favour of 
widespread massacre. This is not surprising. The Black War was still a vivid memory for 
many colonists in Tasmania and Victoria and stories of massacre were pervasive in both 
colonies. By the time Bonwick’s work was published in 1870 however, memories of the 
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war were beginning to fade and some colonists were disturbed that his book had generated 
international interest in the war and in the fate of ‘the last of the Tasmanian Aborigines’.  
With Tasmania’s violent past returning to haunt them, some colonists sought their own 
champion who would make the past more palatable.   
 
1875-1939 
 
If the hour produces the man, then James Erskine Calder, the colony’s former surveyor 
general, filled the breach. He had arrived in the colony at the height of the Black War in 
1829 and became firmly committed to the settlers’ determination to transform Tasmania 
into a vast sheepwalk. Determined to restore the colony’s reputation, that he believed had 
been tarnished by Bonwick’s work, he located the ‘nineteen awful volumes’ of official 
archival sources of the war in the Colonial Secretary’s Office in Hobart and found a very 
different story of the Black War from Bonwick’s account. Instead of reports of massacres 
he found instead, numerous accounts of ‘fictitious fights’, which ‘though still repeated by 
lovers of the marvelous and horrible, were found to be utterly false on investigation’ 
(Calder 1875:7). He continued:  
 
 I know of no trustworthy record of more than one, two, three or at most 
four persons being killed, in any one encounter. The warfare, though pretty 
continuous, was rather a petty affair, with grossly exaggerated details – 
something like the story of the hundred dead men, reduced, on inquiry, to 
three dead dogs….Up to the time of their voluntary surrender …the 
[Aborigines] not only maintained the ground everywhere …. they had by far 
the best of the fight; … and as far as I can learn, at least five of the [settlers] 
dying  for one of the [Aborigines] (Calder 1875:8).   
 
Furthermore, he argued, the Aborigines were responsible for their own demise. They had 
died, not from mass killings by the colonists, but from intertribal wars and ‘to the 
prevalence of epidemic disorders; which, though not introduced by the Europeans, were 
possibly accidentally increased by them…and their own imprudence’ in refusing to use 
European remedies to treat them (Calder 1875: 25-7).   
 
From that moment, massacre denial took hold. Based on the doctrine of Aboriginal self-
extermination, Calder’s work absolved the colonists from responsibility for the past. Indeed 
massacre denial had some interesting spin offs. In 1898, James Backhouse Walker 
suggested that at the colony’s founding massacre at Risdon Cove in 1804, the cannon, 
which every one agreed had been fired at the Aborigines, may have been ‘loaded with 
blank cartridge’ rather than ‘grape’, because ‘we have no means of deciding’ (Walker 1973: 
52).  
 
By the end of nineteenth century the massacre debate appeared to have been resolved, with 
a resounding victory for the massacre denialists. This is not surprising. The era was 
dominated by the doctrine of Aboriginal self-extermination, derived from discourse of 
scientific racism which placed the Tasmanian Aborigines at the lower end of the human 
evolutionary scale where they were considered as far too primitive to withstand British 
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colonisation.  By World War II this discourse had relegated the Black War to a melancholy 
footnote in Tasmania’s history in which the Aborigines had simply ‘faded away’ (Giblin 
1939: 20).  
 
1948-2008  
 
At the end of World War II however the debate was rekindled.  Clive Turnbull, a war 
correspondent who was imbued with ‘the long shadows of massacre remembrance’ handed 
down by his own family which had settled in Tasmania in the 1820s, produced his powerful 
text, Black War: the extermination of the Tasmanian Aborigines.  From his exhaustive 
search of the newspaper and official published sources of the war he was in no doubt that 
massacre played a key role in the extermination of the Aborigines. He claimed that in 1828, 
‘the wiping out of the Aborigines began in earnest’ (Turnbull 1965: 80) and that most 
massacres had probably occurred during the martial law phase, between November 1828 
and January 1832 (Turnbull 1965: 97). But he could find little real evidence for the 
fragmentary accounts of massacre in the published sources were too garbled to make sense 
of. Perhaps his experience as a war correspondent enabled him to read between the lines.   
 
Twenty years later, however, Turnbull’s claims were contested by Brian Plomley, the editor 
of the Tasmanian journals of the conciliator, G.A. Robinson (Plomley 1966).  Despite the 
fact that Robinson had recorded several instances of massacre which had not previously 
been in the public record, Plomley was convinced that massacre was a rare event in the 
Black War. In his annotated bibliography of the Tasmanian Aborigines, published in 1969, 
he questioned in particular, Bonwick’s claims about widespread massacre:    
 
his uncritical acceptance of the stories told him by “old hands” has reduced 
their value considerably. Bonwick’s statements, if not confirmed from 
primary sources, should largely be considered as suspect, and opened to 
doubt in great or small degree. Many of his informants had little or no 
understanding of the events they witnessed, if indeed they themselves 
witnessed them (Plomley 1969).   
 
Plomley’s attack was taken very seriously by younger scholars like me. Embarking on my 
own research into the history of the Tasmanian Aborigines, I largely avoided Bonwick’s 
work. In my own book, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, I argued that Aboriginal resistance 
rather than settler activism was the key feature of the Black War and believed that most 
Aborigines were probably killed in ones and twos although at four times the rate  of the 
settlers (Ryan 1981:174). While I did record six instances of massacre, I concluded that 
they had little bearing on the war’s outcome.   
 
Lloyd Robson, Tasmania’s leading historian, disagreed. Like Turnbull he was also a 
Tasmanian ‘native son’, brought up with ‘the long shadows of massacre remembrance’. In 
A History of Tasmania Volume I, he made a particular study of at least eleven incidents of 
massacre during the Black War, based on his exhaustive reading of all the known sources 
(Robson 1983: 210-253). This damning evidence left Robson in no doubt that massacre 
was widely used to exterminate the Aborigines (Robson 1983:211-219).   
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At this point the massacre debate reached an impasse. The evidence appeared to support 
both points of view. What was needed now was an account which brought settler activism 
and Aboriginal resistance together.  
 
However, this did not happen. A decade later, Plomley re-entered the debate. In his 
exhaustive survey of the newspaper and archival sources of the war, published in The 
Aboriginal/Settler Clash in Van Diemen’s Land 1803-1831, he was determined to present 
what he called the ‘written record’ as unfettered data so that readers could, objectively, 
reach their own conclusions about massacre (Plomley 1992:7). He had particular respect for 
some of the archival sources:  
 
So far as the official record is concerned, it is on the whole a factual one 
because it is based on statements by the magistrates of the various districts. 
The errors here lie chiefly in the exaggerations of the informants, who 
striving to present their cases in the best possible light claimed that larger 
bodies of Aborigines were involved, or were killed, and that greater damage 
was done (Plomley 1992:7).     
 
But he little respected the integrity of newspaper sources, in particular the non-official 
press, which ‘not only paid as much attention to rumour as to events, but commented freely 
upon the situation. Rumour sometimes led a newspaper to proclaim atrocities in one issue 
and refute them in the next’ (Plomley 1992:8). Yet some of these ‘rumours’ of massacre 
were recorded as fact by G.A. Robinson in his journals.   
 
Instead of following up the stories he contended instead, that ‘wanton attack and ill-
treatment by the settlers was confined to a few individuals’ and only sometimes ‘by the 
mob’, although he did acknowledge that the ‘Ku Klux Klan type mob who hunted down 
and killed parties of Aborigines is on record in Robinson’s journals, but as might be 
expected was never the occasion for comment’ (Plomley 1992:9). Furthermore, ‘the decline 
in the population was, generally speaking, gradual, although more or less rapid at one time 
or another’ (Plomley 1992:11) and that in 1824, there were only 600 Aborigines in the war 
zone of eastern part of Tasmania.  
 
Yet none of the contemporary evidence supported this conclusion. Had he compared G.A. 
Robinson’s reports of massacre with accounts in the colonial press and also the official 
sources, he might have reached a different conclusion. Plomley’s unrivalled reputation as a 
scholar however, placed his findings beyond criticism and conferred on this particular work 
the status of an objective historical document.   
 
In 1995 for example, Henry Reynolds used it as the key source to argue that ‘the numbers 
[of Aborigines] actually killed by Europeans may have been less than is generally 
supposed’ (Reynolds 1995: 51), that the massacres that Robinson recorded along the 
Meander River ‘were rare in Tasmania’ (Reynolds 1995:79) and that ‘the mortality rate on 
each side was more even: perhaps somewhere between 150 and 250 Tasmanians were 
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killed in conflict with the Europeans after 1824 (with another 100 or 150 dying before that 
date), while they killed about 170 Europeans’ (Reynolds 1995:82).  
 
In removing massacre almost entirely from the Black War, Reynolds had, albeit 
unintentionally, established the pre-conditions for Keith Windschuttle to enter the debate in 
2002.  However, Windschuttle’s idiosyncratic approach to the investigation of eleven 
alleged incidents of massacre, in which, like Plomley, he summarily dismissed or wilfully 
ignored just about every known piece of contemporary evidence (Windschuttle 2002: 131-
166), led other historians to reach the opposite conclusion. They now considered that these 
incidents had probably taken place after all (Boyce 2003, McFarlane 2003, Ryan 2003).  
 
Rather than shutting down the debate, as Windschuttle had expected to do, he has, 
perversely, opened it up new methods of investigation.  Many recent studies of the Black 
War, including investigations of specific incidents of massacre and nuanced studies of 
specific regions in colonial Tasmania, have concluded that massacre was most likely to 
have been used as a deliberate strategy to destroy targeted groups of Aborigines in 
particular areas of Tasmania during specific phases of the Black War (Breen 2001, Ryan 
2006, 2008, Kiernan 2007, McFarlane 2008, Madley 2008).  
 
This new research leaves the reader in no doubt that the strategic use of massacre in the war 
resulted in the deaths of many hundreds of Aboriginal men, women and children. This 
evidence offers the clearest explanation yet for the grim statistic that historians first 
confronted in 1834, that fewer than 250 Aborigines had survived.    
 
Conclusion 
 
In 2008, the massacre debate has turned full circle from its origins in 1835.The long 
shadow of massacre remembrance, that informed the debate at the outset, only to be 
discarded in later periods, has gained new resonance. While the debate is by no means 
settled, more recent research suggests that it has already made the transition from its 
exclusively Tasmanian context to comparative trans national settings. In this new 
environment the massacre debate will, undoubtedly, take off into interesting and important 
new directions.    
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Lyndall Ryan’s long interest in Aboriginal history has contested two long held beliefs:  that 
Aboriginal people did not resist colonial occupation of their lands; and that the colonists 
did not actively destroy them, rather they ‘faded away’ from introduced disease. In The 
Aboriginal Tasmanians 1981, 1996), she argued that contrary to widespread belief, the 
Tasmanian Aborigines had resisted colonial occupation and had not ‘faded away’ in 1876 
or in any other period of human history. More recently, in articles published in Journal of 
Genocide Research, the Australian and New Zealand Law and History Journal, and in the 
entry on Tasmania in the International Online Encyclopaedia of Mass Violence she offers 
new evidence that colonial massacre played a significant part in rapid Aboriginal 
population decline in the 19
th
 century.   
 
